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Abstract 
 
Findings for the whole period from January 1987 to December 2006 reveal that 
loser has insignificantly becomes loser and winner has significantly reversed in the 
subsequent period. Arbitrage portfolio does not provide any significant abnormal return 
thus, not consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. This is due to the reason that 
Malaysian investors are overoptimistic. After controlling for size, both small and large 
stocks have significantly support the overreaction hypothesis even after adjustment for 
difference in risk. No evidence of January effect is reported during the period; however, 
there is evidence of Chinese New Year effect documented in the findings. The study also 
shows that Malaysian Stock Market overreacts prior to 1997 Asian Financial crisis. During 
the post crisis, the results are not consistent with overreaction hypothesis. One possible 
reason to this behaviour is that investors are more aware of the phenomenon and have 
altered their trading strategy. As a result, overreaction behaviour diminishes and stock 
market gradually becomes efficient in the post crisis. These findings suggest that stock 
overreaction behaviour in Malaysian stock market only benefited the short-term investors. 
However, when the strategy is based on a longer formation period such as 5-year formation 
period, long-term investors are able to earn significant positive abnormal returns. 
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1.  Introduction 
Overreaction is a tendency for stock return to experience reversals. This is generally resulting from the 
behaviour of market participants who tend to overreact to new information and correct their behaviour 
later. This behaviour of market overreaction implies that stocks that perform best (worst) over an initial 
period tend to perform worst (best) in the subsequent period. This is because investors tend to 
overreact to new information and generate such price movements that go beyond the new equilibrium 
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level justified by the news. Later, as investors realize that they have unduly reacted to the information 
and trade on the overreaction, price will change to the opposite direction of the initial movements and 
approached its equilibrium. 
Stock overreaction hypothesis suggests that investors are likely to overreact to a series of news 
pointing towards the same direction such that companies that have performed badly (well) over a 
period of time (i.e. 3 years, 5 years) will subsequently reverse this trend. Therefore, stock Overreaction 
Hypothesis implies that there is some predictability exists in stock market. These easily implemented 
profitable trading strategies due stock overreaction have implication for the validity of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH). Consistent abnormal profits earned by such strategies appear inconsistent 
with market efficiency, in which, it violates the weak form market efficiency. Fama (1970) defines 
stock market as efficient if stock prices fully “reflect” available information. This definition implies 
that the available information cannot be used to forecast stock prices in a fully efficient market. The 
theory argues that current prices formed in a competitive and well-regulated market place reflect all 
known relevant information. Ariff, Shamsher and Annuar (1998) assert that future prices will be based 
upon arrival of new information, or new interpretation of existing information given more recent 
developments. Therefore, price changes are not due to stock overreaction and underreaction, but are 
due to new information. Since these changes are equally likely to be in either positive or negative 
direction, thus, it is not possible to make consistent predictions about how future prices will move 
based on past price patterns. If stock overreaction is true, then it would be possible to predict future 
prices based upon past price information to earn excess profit. This also means that stock prices on 
Bursa Malaysia will not be in its weak form efficiency if the evidence supports the overreaction 
hypothesis. 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate evidence of stock overreaction behaviour 
in the Malaysian Stock Market over a period between January 1987 and December 2006. This study 
also attempt to find out what investment strategy could provide potential abnormal profit in this stock 
market. This paper is divided into five sections. Section two briefly reviews evidence of stock 
overreaction whereas section three and four elaborate the methodology and findings of this study. 
Section five concludes the study. 
 
 
2.  Literature Review 
The empirical evidences on the reversal behaviour of stock price are inconclusive. De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) reported that stocks that perform worst over a period subsequently outperform stocks 
that perform best over the same prior period. Chan (1988) and Ball, Kothari and Shanken (1995) argue 
that this winner-loser effect is due to time varying risk. In contrast, De Bondt and Thaler (1987), 
Zarowin (1990) and Spyrou et al (2005) document that risk differences cannot explain this overreaction 
effect. Zarowin (1990) proposes that size effect is one of the factors that could explain the winner-loser 
effect. However, De Bondt and Thaler (1987), and Chiao, et al (2005) conclude that the winner-loser 
effect is not primarily a size effect, because overreaction behaviour is still persist and significant even 
after controlling for size effect. Chen and Sauer (1997) and Otchere and Chan (2003) focus on the 
persistent of overreaction behaviour in different time period. Chen and Sauer (1997) find that 
overreaction effect is most evident during the pre-war and pre-energy-crisis periods and becomes 
weaker during the post war and post energy-crisis eras. Otchere and Chan (2003) also report 
inconsistency in the stock overreaction of Hong Kong Stock Market where overreaction effect exist 
prior to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis but diminish during the post crisis period. With regard to the 
length of the formation period, Saleh (2007) and Campbell and Limmack (1997) show that loser 
continue to be loser in the shorter formation period, but in the longer formation period of up to five 
years, loser portfolio reversed and has outperformed the winner portfolio. 
In Malaysia, evidences of overreaction in stock returns are documented in studies by Hameed 
and Ting (2000), Ahmad and Hussain (2001) and Lai et al (2003). Their results are robust in the sense 
that risk, size and January effects cannot explain the overreaction behaviour found in the Malaysian 
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Stock Market. Ahmad and Hussain (2001) however, report the existence of Chinese New Year effect in 
the overreaction profile of Bursa Malaysia. There is no study in Malaysia thus far that highlight the 
consistency of stock overreaction behaviour in different time period as well as the sensitivity of 
overreaction effect to the length of the formation period. 
 
 
3.  Methodology 
3.1. Stock overreaction 
The study follows a two-step procedure to test for overreaction in Malaysian stock market over a 
period of 20 years starting on January 1987 and ending on December 2006. Firstly, the study identifies 
non-overlapping 24-month periods. The availability of data over a period of 20 years provides 9 non-
overlapping 24-month (two-year) portfolio formation (rank) periods, namely 1987-1988, 1989-1990, 
1991-1992, 1993-1994, 1995-1996, 1997-1998, 1999-2000, 2001-2002, and 2003-2004, and the 
corresponding test periods, which are 1989-1990, 1991-1992, 1993-1994, 1995-1996, 1997-1998, 
1999-2000, 2001-2002, 2003-2004 and 2005-2006. Secondly, at the end of each rank period, the study 
then identifies all companies with a complete set of return for a particular rank period. Gaunt (2000) 
suggests that this will avoid the look-ahead bias. In order to avoid the survivorship bias, the study 
follows Chiao and Hueng (2004), where the sample firms are not required to remain listed for any test 
period. The number of qualified firms in the sample is expected to gradually increase due to increase of 
new listing during the sampling period. 
The study follows the basic framework of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) with adjustment to size 
effect, seasonality effect and time-varying risk of Chan (1988). The study calculates returns for stock 
listed on Bursa Malaysia by using the following formula: 
 
Where, represents return on security i at period t, and  represent price on security i 
at period t and period t -1. The return metric used here is the natural logarithmic of the stock monthly 
closing price obtained from Datastream.. The same calculation is carried out for return on market with 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index (KLSE CI) being used as a proxy for the market. 
Monthly data is used because according to Mun et al (2000), daily data has substantial random white 
noise associated with it. The use of monthly data could avoid the problem that arise with using daily or 
weekly data, both with respect to risk and returns variables, including the bid-ask spread and the 
consequences of infrequent trading. This study then computes monthly market adjusted abnormal 
return (AR) for stock i as: 
 
Where  and  are returns for stock i and market m, respectively. Secondly, the study 
computes cumulative abnormal returns (CARi) for every stock over the 24-month period starting 
January 1987 and ending December 1988. This period is known as the portfolio formation period (FP). 
 
These stocks are then ranked based on their CARs over the two-year formation period and 
portfolios are formed. Firms in the top 20% are assigned to the winner portfolio (W) and in the bottom 
20% to the loser portfolio (L). Buying loser and selling winner forms arbitrage portfolios. The winner, 
loser and arbitrage portfolios are then held for the next 24 months. In the subsequent test period, 
January 1989 to December 1990, the CARs of all stocks in the winner and loser portfolios are 
recomputed. For every test period at the interval of 1 and 24, the CARs for all stocks in the winner and 
loser portfolios are calculated as follows. 
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where z is the test period (1,2, ... 9), N is the number of stocks assigned in each portfolio for each 
formation period and  is the cumulative abnormal returns in month t of the test period z for 
portfolio p. The study then repeats the above method for all nine-formation periods and their 
subsequent test periods. One sample t-test and independent sample t-test of mean difference of the two 
portfolios (portfolio winner and portfolio loser) were then applied to identify the difference in 
abnormal returns of these portfolios during the test period. 
 
3.2. One sample t-test 
One sample t-test is used to examine whether the loser portfolio and the winner portfolio reverse their 
fortune in the subsequent test period. To achieve this goal, the average CAR across all test periods (z) 
for each of the portfolio in each month between t = 1 and t = 24 are calculated 
 
where p could be a winner (W) or loser (L). ACAR is tested to see if they are significantly different 
from zero. The first part of the analysis investigates whether stocks with poor (good) price performance 
over a two-year period, become relatively better (worse) performers over the following two-year 
period. Then, the study compare the test period abnormal returns between winner and loser portfolios 
to see if there any potential for exploiting these patterns through arbitrage (i.e. contrarian strategy). The 
overreaction predicts that for t > 0, ACARW,t < 0 and ACARL,t > 0. Alternatively, the null hypothesis 
can be written as: 
H0: [ACARL,t – ACARW,t ] > 0. 
In order to examine the statistical significance of the difference between the loser and the 
winner portfolios, the study needs a pooled estimate of the population variance in CARs. As in De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985), the actual estimate is calculated as follows: 
 
Where z is the number of the test period, which is 9. The t-statistic is therefore: 
 
Negative significant t-values for the winner portfolio would suggest that there is evidence of 
stock overreaction existed in the sample, in which it implies that the winner portfolio has reversed and 
perform significantly badly during the test period. The reverse is true for the loser portfolio. Positive 
significant t-values for the loser portfolio support the overreaction hypothesis by suggesting that the 
loser portfolio has performed significantly better in the test period. Meanwhile, positive significant t-
value for the arbitrage portfolio indicates that contrarian strategy of buying loser and selling winner 
portfolios would produce significant abnormal returns in the subsequent period as suggested by the 
overreaction hypothesis. 
 
3.3. Independent samples t-test 
The study employs the independent samples t-test to ascertain the difference in mean cumulative 
abnormal return (CARs) of the two portfolios in the independent samples t-test over the test period. 
The t-test used is: 
 
Where 
: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return of loser portfolio 
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: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return of winner portfolio 
: Standard deviation of the loser portfolio 
: Standard deviation of the winner portfolio 
: Number of firms in the loser portfolio 
 Number of firms in the winner portfolio 
The null and the alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
 
The mean difference in the CARs of the two portfolios are estimated and tested. Significant t-
values in the differences would suggest that the mean returns of the two portfolios are different. A 
positive significant t-values support the overreaction hypothesis. It implies that loser portfolio has 
outperformed winner portfolio in the test period. 
 
3.4. Long run overreaction with adjustment to size 
The study extends the investigation of the long run overreaction by controlling for firm size to 
ascertain if the contrarian profits are just due to small firm size effect. The study controls for firm size 
by constructing three sizes sorted groups, which are small, medium, and large based on market value of 
the stocks at the end of the formation period. Stocks are first assigned to winner and loser portfolio 
based on rank period return, then each of the loser and winner portfolios are broken into three size 
portfolios of small, medium and large. The methodology describes in the previous section is repeated 
here for the small winner, small loser, large winner and large loser portfolios. 
 
3.5. Long run overreaction with adjustment to time varying risk 
In view of the contention by Chan (1988) that risk associated with a portfolios are more likely to 
change overtime, this study extends the analysis by taking into consideration the aspect of time-varying 
risk. Consistent with Chan (1988), this study assumes that expected returns are generated by Sharpe-
Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The study also assumes that the presence of abnormal 
returns can be tested via examining the value of α in the following equation: 
 
In order to examine the change in risk from the formation period to the test period as well as the 
presence of abnormal returns in the formation period and the test period, the above equation is 
modified slightly to: 
 
Where t is between 1 and 24, Dt is a dummy variable equal to zero in the ranking period (t <= 
24) and to 1 in the test period (t > 24). The abnormal return in the ranking period is estimated by α1i 
and that of the test period is estimated by α2i. The ranking period risk is βi and the test period’s is βi + 
βiD. If the risk of a portfolio unchanged, then βiD, which indicates the change in the risk of the portfolio 
from the rank to the test period, should be equal to zero. Hence, the study investigates if there is any 
change in the beta of the winner, loser and arbitrage portfolios from the rank to the test periods. 
 
3.6. Long run overreaction with adjustment to seasonality effect 
Several US studies, including De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Zarowin (1990) have found 
evidence of a seasonality effect namely the January effect in the general level of stock returns. Such 
monthly seasonality in the overreaction profile is also investigated in this study. Ahmad and Hussain 
(2001) present that Bursa Malaysia abnormal returns are greater in February than any other months. 
Based on that, they suggest the existence of a February effect or Chinese New Year (CNY) effect in 
returns of Malaysian stock market. The study uses dummy variables to investigate monthly seasonality 
in the pattern of abnormal returns. 
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Where ARt means monthly abnormal returns of all stocks in a winner and loser portfolio in 
month t. Dt is dummy variable which takes 1 for monthly observation from February and a value of 0 
elsewhere. Ψ1 and Ψ2 are the model’s parameters and εt is random error following OLS assumptions. 
The above method is repeated to test for January effect. Dt is dummy variable which takes 1 for 
monthly observation from January and a value of 0 elsewhere. The null hypothesis is: 
Ψ2 = 0 
 Ψ2 > 0 
 
 
4.  Findings 
4.1. Long run stock overreaction 
Table 1 displays results of differences in Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) between loser and 
winner in the test period for 2-year portfolio formation in the Malaysian stock market over the period 
between January 1987 and December 2006. 
 
Table 1: Differences in CARs the test period for 2-year portfolio formation 
 
Mean CAR Formation Period Test Period 
Loser Winner Loser - Winner t-value 
87-88 89-90 33.14 6.09 27.09 1.957** 
89-90 91-92 7.53 -27.82 20.29 1.761* 
91-92 93-94 66.31 16.94 49.37 5.073*** 
93-94 95-96 1.10 -13.02 14.19 1.801* 
95-96 97-98 -38.35 -57.22 18.87 1.993** 
97-98 99-00 -37.49 -20.04 -17.45 -2.151** 
99-00 01-02 -35.75 -14.31 -21.44 -2.430** 
01-02 03-04 -15.76 -10.75 -5.00 -0.652 
03-04 05-06 -38.51 -31.45 -7.06 -0.861 
Notes: *, ** and *** denotes significant at 10% , 5% and 1% respectively. 
H0 : ACARL = ACARW ; Ha: ACARL > ACARW 
 
Table 1 presents that five out of nine test periods, mean CARs are significantly greater for loser 
than for winner. These results are therefore consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. The results 
also show that loser has significantly outperformed winner for portfolio formed before 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis. Those that are formed after the crisis period, however does not follow the 
overreaction hypothesis where winner portfolio tends to significantly outperformed loser portfolio. The 
findings suggest that there exist strong overreaction phenomenon in the Malaysian stock market before 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis period. The results are also statistically significant in all the 5 periods 
before the crisis. These significant results of loser outperformed winner may have implications on the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Consistent abnormal returns earned by resorting to strategy based 
on overreaction of selling winner portfolio and buying loser portfolio during the period before the 
crisis may indicates the inconsistency of Bursa Malaysia to the weak-form of EMH. Bursa Malaysia 
may not be weakly efficient before the crisis. 
However, after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, evidence of overreaction behaviour diminishes. 
Findings show that loser portfolio exhibit continuation behaviour by continually becoming loser in the 
test period, whereas winner portfolio displays reversal behaviour. Arbitrage strategy of selling winner 
portfolio and buying loser portfolio on the other hand does not earned positive return at all. The absent 
of the reversal behaviour after the crisis could be due to the reason that investors are more aware of the 
overreaction phenomenon and have altered their trading strategy. Another explanation may be the 
possible reduction of noise trader during the crisis period. De Long et. al (1990) argue that in the 
presence of noise trader, rational speculation can be destabilizing. Therefore, as time goes by, the stock 
overreaction behaviour gradually diminishes and stock market gradually becomes more “efficient”. 
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These patterns are shown in Table 1 where the negative zero-investment returns of loser minus winner 
become insignificant during the 2001/2002 and 2003/2004 periods. Malaysian stock market seems to 
be more efficient after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis period. 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results of one-sample test for stock overreaction behaviour 
before and after 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Table 2 corroborates findings of stock overreaction 
behaviour reported earlier in Table 1. 
 
Table 2: Long run stock overreaction Pre-1997 Asian Financial  
 
Loser Winner Arbitrage Month Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value 
1 1.67 0.925 -2.06 -0.781 3.74 1.092 
2 5.90 2.365 * 0.21 0.062 5.69 1.344 
3 6.56 2.311* -0.85 -0.212 7.41 1.770* 
4 6.92 1.404 1.49 0.444 5.43 1.976* 
5 8.03 1.026 -0.09 -0.15 8.12 1.836* 
6 5.78 1.193 -0.64 -0.107 6.41 1.710* 
7 9.35 1.528 0.81 0.141 8.54 3.087** 
8 10.72 1.389 5.83 0.771 4.90 0.571 
9 12.68 1.263 3.39 0.465 9.29 1.084 
10 11.38 0.912 4.73 0.536 6.65 0.525 
11 9.37 0.608 5.79 0.557 3.58 0.191 
12 5.90 0.282 3.02 0.311 2.89 0.120 
13 5.38 0.256 -0.44 -0.065 5.82 0.288 
14 13.02 0.612 -3.14 -0.409 16.15 1.089 
15 9.56 0.451 -5.75 -0.634 15.20 1.194 
16 7.11 0.310 -1.29 -0.618 8.40 0.487 
17 4.63 0.215 -4.88 -0.569 9.51 0.639 
18 4.49 0.217 -4.79 -0.571 9.28 0.592 
19 5.78 0.266 -9.41 -0.838 15.20 1.354 
20 8.38 0.399 -0.70 -0.075 9.07 0.530 
21 14.19 0.671 3.36 0.353 10.83 0.598 
22 11.47 0.600 -0.58 -0.076 12.05 0.810 
23 15.98 0.995 -2.54 -0.339 18.52 1.868* 
24 10.56 0.578 -6.12 -0.774 16.70 1.325 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively. Statistical significant is reduced due to smaller size. 
 
As shown in Table 2, both loser and winner portfolios have reversed in the subsequent period 
after portfolio formation. Loser portfolio has significantly reversed and becomes winner portfolio by 
earning abnormal profit of 5.9% and 6.56% in month 2 to month 3 of the test period respectively. 
However, the results of the study become insignificant from month 4 through month 24 of the test 
period. On the other hand, winner portfolio has insignificantly reversed and becomes loser from month 
13 through month 24 of the test period. The findings simply convey that single trading strategy based 
on winner and loser alone will not earned significant abnormal returns. Although both portfolio 
exhibited reversal behaviour and are consistent with the overreaction hypothesis, the strategy is not be 
economically profitable. However, a strategy that combines loser and winner portfolio together such as 
contrarian strategy generates potential abnormal returns as exhibit in column three of Table 2. The 
findings show that arbitrage portfolio of selling winner and buying loser earns significant abnormal 
returns from month 3 through month 7 of the test period. The results suggest that Malaysian Stock 
Market overreacts prior to 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. This result is in agreement to those reported by 
Ahmad and Hussain (2001) and Lai et al (2003). Ahmad and Hussain (2001) find evidence of stock 
overreaction behaviour in the Malaysian Stock Market for the period of 1986-1996. The same findings 
are also reported by Lai et al (2003) for the same market over the period between January 1987 and 
December 1999. 
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics - Issue 34 (2009) 182 
Table 3: Long run stock overreaction Post 1997 Asian Financial 
 
Loser Winner Arbitrage Month Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value 
1 0.33 0.319 -2.85 -1.430 3.18 1.065 
2 -2.44 -3.429* -5.32 -1.957* 2.88 0.862 
3 -9.48 -2.180* -8.82 -2.027* -0.67 -1.793 
4 -15.04 -1.806 -6.68 -4.226** -8.36 -1.212 
5 -25.36 -1.844 -7.24 -1.715 -18.12 -1.301 
6 -22.17 -1.466 -6.91 -1.400 -15.25 -1.112 
7 -18.89 -1.198 -6.48 -8.850 -12.41 -1.007 
8 -18.09 -1.217 -7.85 -0.913 -10.25 -0.946 
9 -18.16 -1.236 -10.89 -1.101 -7.27 -0.883 
10 -19.66 -1.294 -10.36 -0.970 -9.30 -0.908 
11 -21.87 -1.318 -10.79 -0.920 -11.07 -0.905 
12 -26.24 -1.457 -15.45 -1.453 -10.80 -0.720 
13 -27.76 -1.445 -13.74 1.552 -14.01 -0.748 
14 -25.53 -1.419 -14.32 -1.644 -11.22 -0.648 
15 -21.26 -1.477 -14.27 -2.040* -6.98 -0.508 
16 -14.48 -1.143 -11.68 -1.832 -2.80 -0.249 
17 -15.88 -1.329 -14.19 -2.104* -1.70 -0.151 
18 -18.12 -1.550 -15.47 -2.703* -2.65 -0.208 
19 -20.33 -1.706 -16.37 -2.860* -3.96 -0.300 
20 -26.94 -2.020 -19.49 -3.289* -7.45 -0.695 
21 -33.78 -1.947 -20.13 -3.225* -13.65 -0.636 
22 -41.51 -1.764 -21.59 -3.949* -19.23 -0.705 
23 -51.33 -1.645 -21.33 -3.514* -30.00 -0.818 
24 -64.69 -1.499 -22.51 -4.615** -42.18 -0.887 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively. Statistical significant is reduced due to smaller size. 
 
After 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, evidence of stock overreaction behaviour as described in 
Table 2 seems to diminish. Loser portfolio exhibits continuation behaviour whereas winner portfolio 
displays reversal behaviour. Furthermore, arbitrage strategy does not provide any potential abnormal 
returns as reported by column three of Table 3. The findings support earlier conclusion that Malaysian 
stock market is “more efficient” after the crisis. 
The study suggests that stock overreaction behaviour in Bursa Malaysia is not consistent. 
During the sub-period of Pre-1997 Asian Financial Crisis, there are evidences of overreaction in stock 
returns existed in the market. In contrast, the Post 1997 Asian Financial Crisis shows no evidence of 
the existence of stock overreaction behaviour in market during the sub-period. These findings are in 
agreement to those documented by Chen and Sauer (1997) and Otchere and Chan (2003). Chen and 
Sauer (1997) also reported inconsistency of stock returns behaviour in the U.S market, where the 
overreaction hypothesis is most evident during the pre-war period but becomes ambiguous during the 
post war period of 1940s and 1950s. Overreaction however, becomes evident again during the pre-
energy-crisis regime of 1960s and 1970s, but weakens substantially during the post energy-crisis era. 
According to Chen and Sauer (1997), this inconsistency in results of the study suggest that 
returns obtained from the contrarian strategy utilizing the overreaction concept are not time stationary 
because there are periods when the strategy becomes profitable, and there are periods when the strategy 
earns negative returns as well as no abnormal returns at all. Therefore, if consistent performance is 
important for contrarian strategy that based on overreaction hypothesis to be successful as suggested by 
Chen and Sauer (1997), then the overreaction hypothesis is not working in Bursa Malaysia. 
Furthermore, inconsistent overreaction effect in the market implies that the anomaly is not exploitable 
to systematically beat the market, or in other word, one cannot manipulate the stock overreaction 
behaviour existed in the market to earn abnormal returns on a consistent basis. Therefore, as suggested 
by Ariff, Shamsher and Annuar (1998), this anomaly may not in itself be a sufficient condition to reject 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). This study suggests that Malaysian stock market is inefficient 
183 International Research Journal of Finance and Economics - Issue 34 (2009) 
in the period prior to Asian Financial Crisis. However, the inefficiency slowly fades away and market 
becoming more efficient in the post crisis period. The inefficiency in the prior period may have 
contributed to the efficiency of the market. Figure 1 further demonstrates the behaviour of loser, 
winner and arbitrage portfolio before 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
Figure 1: Test Period Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Loser, Winner and Arbitrage Portfolio Pre-1997 
Asian Financial Crisis 
 
 
 
To further examine evidence of stock overreaction in Bursa Malaysia, this study repeats the 
above methodology on full sample period ranging from January 1987 to December 2006. The results of 
one-sample test are summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: CARs for Loser, Winner and Arbitrage Portfolios for 2-Year formation period. 
 
Loser Winner Arbitrage Month Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value 
1 1.31 1.267 -1.97 -1.259 3.27 1.623* 
2 2.06 1.030 -1.49 -0.677 3.57 1.327 
3 -1.41 -0.373 -3.31 -1.168 1.90 0.532 
4 -2.59 -0.500 -2.29 -0.966 -0.29 -0.88 
5 -6.00 -0.750 -4.04 -1.076 -1.97 -0.312 
6 -4.05 -0.594 -4.16 -1.104 0.12 0.020 
7 -0.49 -0.068 -3.21 -0.779 2.72 0.494 
8 -0.44 0.058 -0.80 -0.148 1.24 0.195 
9 1.30 0.154 -2.65 -0.495 3.95 0.678 
10 -0.42 -0.045 -2.20 -0.354 1.78 0.227 
11 -2.50 -0.234 -1.74 -0.245 -0.76 -0.071 
12 -6.36 -0.480 -5.00 -0.737 -1.37 -0.101 
13 -7.19 -0.532 -6.75 -1.335 -0.44 -0.035 
14 -0.66 -0.048 -8.16 -1.583* 7.50 0.721 
15 -0.28 -0.022 -9.23 -1.717* 8.50 1.011 
16 0.15 0.011 -5.74 -1.197 5.89 0.591 
17 -2.38 -0.193 -8.91 -1.724* 6.53 0.745 
18 -4.33 -0.360 -9.28 -1.839* 4.96 0.535 
19 -3.79 -0.299 -11.83 -1.893* 8.04 1.046 
20 -5.54 -0.425 -8.08 -1.339 2.54 0.241 
21 -5.22 -0.359 -5.94 -0.906 0.72 0.060 
22 -10.07 -0.674 -9.43 -1.691* -0.64 -0.052 
23 -11.09 -0.670 -10.53 -1.964* -0.56 -0.040 
24 -19.86 -0.993 -13.13 -2.522** -6.73 -0.374 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively 
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The results of the study are consistent with international evidence such as Brailsford (1992), 
McInish et al (2006) and Ising et al (2006) for Australian, German and Asian stock market (Japan, 
Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore stock markets) respectively. The 
findings of this study reveal that loser has becoming winner by earning positive abnormal returns one 
month to two month after portfolio formation; however the results are not significant. In month 3 up to 
month 24, loser exhibits continuation behaviour with insignificant negative ACAR. This implies that 
there is no significant difference in ACAR for loser in the formation and the test period. Meanwhile, 
the winner portfolio displays a reverse in fortune for the next subsequent period. This asymmetry 
behaviour of winner and loser suggest that Malaysia’s investors are overoptimistic. According to Ising 
et al, evidence of overreaction behaviour in the winner portfolio together with underreaction behaviour 
in the loser portfolio indicates that investors are overoptimistic, where they overreact to good news and 
responds only slowly to bad news. 
This study finds no clear evidence of stock overreaction hypothesis in Malaysian stock market 
during the period between January 1987 and December 2006 as presented by the insignificant results 
of the arbitrage portfolio. The arbitrage portfolio of selling winner and buying loser earned 
significantly positive ACAR at 10% significant level within one month after portfolio formation. 
However, as time passing by, the ACAR diminishes and sometimes the strategy gives negative ACAR. 
The absence of stock overreaction behaviour suggests that Bursa Malaysia is consistent with weak-
form of EMH, thus, confirms the earlier conclusion of the study. 
Findings of this study have several investment implications. The non-persistence of stock 
overreaction behaviour in the Malaysian stock market only benefited short-term investors, but not the 
long-term investors. Nevertheless, while confined mainly to the winner portfolio, the overreaction 
effect does provide a trading strategy, which appears to offer the potential for significant trading gains 
for those long-term investors. However, these results are based on shorter formation period than that of 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985). Previous studies such as Saleh (2007) and Campbell and Limmack (1997) 
present evidence suggesting that loser tend to underperform winners in the short and medium term but 
tend to outperform winners in the longer terms. To address the issue, this study repeats the above test 
on an extended formation period up to 5 years. The results are discussed in the following section. 
 
4.2. Sensitivity to the length of the formation period 
Table 5 documents the same results as those described in Table 1. Although the study extends portfolio 
formation period to five years, stock overreaction behaviour is only significantly evidenced in the 
period before the crisis. 
 
Table 5: Differences in CARs in the test period for 5-year portfolio formation 
 
Mean CAR Formation Period Test Period 
Loser Winner Loser - Winner t-value 
87-91 92-96 47.33 4.88 42.45 2.534*** 
92-96 97-01 -57.99 -93.48 35.49 2.117** 
97-01 02-06 15.39 2.97 18.36 0.815 
Notes: *,** and *** denotes significant at 10% , 5% and 1% respectively 
 
Table 6 presents the results when the CARs are calculated over a 60-month period or 5-year 
period. Findings suggest that there are evidences of stock overreaction existed in Bursa Malaysia when 
CARs are calculated over 60-month periods. 
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Table 6: CARs for Loser, Winner and Arbitrage Portfolios for 5-Year formation period 
 
Loser Winner Arbitrage 
Month 
Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value 
1 3.24 0.912 0.35 0.306 2.89 1.008 
2 -0.67 -0.075 2.00 0.755 -2.68 -0.427 
3 -2.54 -0.345 3.53 1.032 -6.07 -1.466 
4 5.26 0.634 1.69 0.682 3.57 0.584 
5 0.73 0.136 0.12 0.034 0.61 0.186 
6 -0.25 -0.046 -1.05 -0.247 0.80 0.180 
7 1.73 0.332 -1.73 -0.322 3.46 0.843 
8 2.02 0.283 -5.86 -0.902 7.88 2.375* 
9 -1.04 -0.174 -2.80 -0.407 1.76 0.250 
10 3.79 0.359 -3.90 -0.540 7.70 1.044 
11 8.26 0.476 -10.85 -0.645 19.11 2.331* 
12 -6.66 0-.337 -21.23 -0.901 14.57 1.809 
13 -0.20 -0.009 -21.31 -0.902 21.11 1.687 
14 -2.92 -0.341 -14.98 -0.760 12.07 1.081 
15 -4.30 -0.375 -18.81 -0.858 14.51 1.327 
16 -0.10 -0.005 -19.42 -0.737 19.32 2.140* 
17 11.28 0.482 -18.32 -0.700 29.61 10.551*** 
18 19.12 0.625 -20.52 -0.798 39.64 3.406** 
19 31.36 0.800 -20.42 -0.788 51.79 2.658* 
20 46.94 1.018 -16.38 -0.732 63.33 2.200* 
21 47.86 1.372 -11.84 -0.585 59.70 3.341** 
22 53.83 1.412 -14.04 -0.709 67.87 3.425** 
23 47.73 1.636 -7.43 -0.588 55.15 3.314* 
24 40.14 1.185 -13.69 -0.747 53.83 3.207* 
25 37.02 1.171 -14.60 -0.856 51.62 3.412* 
26 44.91 1.158 -13.57 -0.718 58.49 2.930* 
27 40.53 1.014 -17.23 -0.774 57.77 3.256* 
28 28.48 0.884 -15.152 -0.680 43.63 3.512* 
29 17.899 0.597 -17.57 -0.799 35.46 3.054* 
30 19.15 0.785 -14.22 -0.893 33.37 2.460* 
31 22.74 0.926 -13.72 -0.824 36.46 3.309* 
32 25.30 0.938 -13.823 -0.749 39.12 2.948* 
33 32.33 1.052 -11.59 -0.643 43.92 3.063* 
34 25.26 0.844 -13.08 -0.690 38.34 2.948* 
35 28.41 0.893 -12.53 -0.653 40.95 3.218* 
36 21.92 0.683 -13.45 -0.664 35.36 2.831* 
37 13.70 0.452 -15.57 -0.796 29.27 2.221* 
38 15.78 0.530 -12.08 -0.662 27.80 1.829 
39 12.14 0.423 -12.55 -0.708 24.70 1.618 
40 10.73 0.397 -14.47 -0.788 25.20 1.885 
41 -1.41 -0.051 -18.30 -0.933 16.89 1.019 
42 1.29 0.047 -18.97 -0.860 20.26 1.888 
43 5.06 0.189 -17.32 -0.801 22.381 2.559* 
44 2.92 0.102 -16.93 -0.738 19.85 1.890* 
45 3.58 0.125 -21.47 -0.877 25.05 3.416* 
46 -4.69 -0.160 -23.82 -0.887 19.13 2.054* 
47 -7.14 -0.243 -25.05 -0.928 17.91 1.694 
48 -8.12 -0.258 -29.08 -0.956 20.96 2.256* 
49 -4.377 -0.126 -28.65 -0.927 24.28 2.322* 
50 -6.87 -0.191 -30.84 -0.940 23.97 2.265* 
51 -5.25 -0.135 -32.46 -0.921 27.22 2.618* 
52 9.336 0.239 -26.76 -0.810 36.10 4.466** 
53 7.52 0.214 -26.83 -0.864 34.35 5.17**1 
54 5.46 0.150 -28.07 -0.853 33.53 4.558** 
55 4.22 0.121 -24.63 -0.830 28.86 2.638* 
56 2.96 0.083 -25.99 -0.840 28.95 2.247* 
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Loser Winner Arbitrage 
Month 
Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value 
57 2.39 0.063 -28.72 -0.869 31.11 3.377** 
58 5.43 0.151 -27.98 -0.886 33.40 4.918** 
59 8.32 0.253 -27.69 -0.948 36.01 6.414** 
60 0.86 0.026 -30.34 -0.994 31.20 4.389** 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively. Statistical significant is reduced due to smaller size. 
 
The study shows that evidence of overreaction behaviour could be detected even after four 
months up to five years of portfolio formation. Column three of Table 6 presents results of arbitrage 
portfolio of selling winner and buying loser portfolios. Findings also reveal that arbitrage portfolio 
starts earning significant positive abnormal returns of 11.8% eight months after portfolio formation. As 
time passes by, abnormal returns earned increases to 20.6%, 54.7%, 39%, 27% and 32.42% after 1 
year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years and 5 years of portfolio formation respectively. This finding indicates 
that strategy that based on the overreaction hypothesis such as contrarian strategy of selling winner and 
buying loser has given the long term investors an opportunity to earn significant positive abnormal 
returns if the strategy is based on 5-years performance. 
Generally, the results of the study demonstrate that overreaction behaviour in Malaysia stock 
market is sensitive to the length of the formation period. Loser portfolio will continue to be loser in 
shorter formation period such as two-year formation period. In the longer formation period namely 
five-year formation period, loser and winner portfolio has reversed, and loser has significantly 
outperformed winner portfolio in the test period. These findings lend support to those reported by 
Saleh (2007), and Campbell and Limmack (1997) for Jordon and UK stock market. Their study also 
find that loser continue to be loser in the short term. In the longer term of up to five years, loser 
portfolio reversed and has outperformed winner portfolio. Figure 2 further illustrates the results of 
stock overreaction effect in a graphical form. 
 
Figure 2: CARs for Loser, Winner and Arbitrage Portfolios for 5-Year formation period 
 
 
 
4.3. Stock overreaction with adjustment to firm size 
One explanation of the overreaction hypothesis as described in the previous studies is that losers tend 
to be small and that small firms outperform large firms. Therefore, this study repeats the previous test 
by using size-adjusted returns of winner and loser portfolios. Table 7a displays results of overreaction 
hypothesis for small firms. The findings reveal that both loser and winner portfolio of small firms 
exhibit reversal behaviour. Loser portfolio starts to reverse by earning positive abnormal returns from 
month 7 through month 23 of formation period. Winner portfolio on the other hand starts to reverse as 
early as three months after portfolio formation. The reversal behaviour could be seen to take place 
throughout the test period. Results also suggest that loser has significantly outperformed winner from 
month 12 through month 18 at 10% significant level as exhibit by arbitrage portfolio in column 3 of 
Table 7a. Findings of this study are generally consistent with overreaction behaviour, which asserts 
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that extreme initial movement of stock returns will head for an opposite direction in the subsequent 
period. The same conclusion could be made for large firm as reported in Table 7b. 
Both portfolios of loser and winner of the large firm’s exhibit reversal behaviour with loser 
significantly outperformed winner in month 8 through month 24. The arbitrage portfolios for both large 
and small firms are able to earn significant abnormal profit after about one year from formation period. 
 
Table 7a: CARs for Loser, Winner and Arbitrage Portfolios for small firms. 
 
Loser Winner Arbitrage Month Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value 
1 0.38 0.292 1.04 0.476 -0.65 -0.428 
2 0.69 0.266 2.29 0.696 -1.59 -0.504 
3 -1.63 -0.404 -0.34 -0.085 -1.28 -0.362 
4 -1.54 -0.350 -1.07 -0.250 -0.46 -0.157 
5 -2.86 -0.244 -3.07 -0.487 0.21 0.048 
6 -2.15 -0.489 -1.02 -0.156 -1.12 -0.263 
7 2.69 0.508 2.13 0.249 0.56 0.118 
8 4.15 0.607 -0.58 -0.069 4.73 1.105 
9 5.47 0.658 -0.74 -0.080 6.22 1.315 
10 3.51 0.373 -2.47 -0.224 5.99 1.133 
11 3.64 0.317 -3.53 -0.318 7.18 1.177 
12 0.66 0.045 -11.65 -1.047 12.31 1.609* 
13 0.65 0.048 -8.79 -0.793 9.44 1.386 
14 6.52 0.448 -4.91 -0.441 11.43 1.568* 
15 6.27 0.446 -6.02 -0.505 12.29 1.929* 
16 7.78 0.534 -3.81 -0.333 11.59 1.785* 
17 3.88 0.293 -6.95 -0.598 10.83 1.827* 
18 2.13 0.166 -8.71 -0.773 10.85 1.572* 
19 1.65 0.123 -7.29 -0.674 8.94 1.282 
20 1.46 0.103 -7.36 -0.608 8.82 1.163 
21 4.71 0.308 -5.34 -0.430 10.06 1.359 
22 1.86 0.135 -10.03 -0.939 11.89 1.762* 
23 2.60 0.202 -8.99 -0.850 11.58 1.923* 
24 -2.25 -0.169 -14.12 -1.419* 11.87 1.693* 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively 
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Table 7b: CARs for Loser, Winner and Arbitrage Portfolios for large firms. 
 
Loser Winner Arbitrage Month Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value Mean Difference t-value 
1 3.75 1.857* 0.76 0.602 2.99 1.704* 
2 2.21 0.642 2.32 1.030 -0.12 -0.054 
3 -0.99 -0.216 2.49 0.785 -3.48 -0.986 
4 2.16 0.458 1.13 0.455 1.03 0.257 
5 2.60 0.421 -0.76 -0.258 3.37 0.682 
6 4.88 0.945 -0.68 -0.221 5.55 1.093 
7 7.87 1.188 -0.71 -0.233 8.58 1.360 
8 2.27 1.168 -3.29 -1.012 10.57 2.001* 
9 6.34 1.024 -3.88 -1.130 10.23 2.860** 
10 8.34 0.915 -5.23 -1.393 13.58 2.137* 
11 6.72 0.635 -9.40 -1.767* 16.12 2.400** 
12 1.71 0.145 -14.91 -1.738* 16.62 2.611** 
13 7.88 0.493 -14.33 -1.714* 22.21 1.991* 
14 10.81 0.690 -12.18 -1.933* 22.99 1.902* 
15 10.84 0.691 -12.74 -1.970* 23.58 2.004* 
16 11.35 0.761 -12.94 -1.527 24.30 2.398** 
17 7.53 0.523 -15.04 -1.761* 22.57 2.404** 
18 7.41 0.541 -15.60 -1.916* 23.00 2.646** 
19 10.37 0.715 -15.28 -1.933* 25.65 2.752** 
20 7.38 0.580 -14.95 -2.148* 22.33 2.886** 
21 6.35 0.522 -13.29 -1.942* 19.65 2.547** 
22 6.09 0.515 -14.39 -2.213** 20.49 2.702** 
23 9.05 0.822 -11.32 -2.233** 20.37 2.796** 
24 2.90 0.231 -15.67 -2.486** 18.56 2.067* 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively 
 
Findings generally suggest that strategy based on overreaction hypothesis of buying loser and 
selling winner could generate potential abnormal profit for both large and small firms. Figure 3 and 4 
present the results of stock overreaction with adjustment to size in graphical form. 
 
Figure 3: CARs for Loser, Winner and Arbitrage Portfolios of Large Firms. 
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Figure 4: CARs for Loser, Winner and Arbitrage Portfolios of Small Firms. 
 
 
 
4.4. Stock overreaction with adjustment to time varying risk 
Chan (1988) proposes that the risk of winner and loser stocks is not constant overtime. Therefore, loser 
outperforms winner portfolio in the test period may be due to the reason that loser portfolio is less risky 
than the winner portfolio in the subsequent period following the formation period. Following Gaunt 
(2000) and Lai et al (2003), this study extends the analysis by taking into consideration adjustment for 
time varying risk. Table 8 and Table 9 summarize results of long run stock overreaction after 
controlling for time varying risk. 
 
Table 8: Overreaction effect with adjustment to risk: Mean abnormal return 
 
Loser Winner Arbitrage Period 
α1i α2i α1i α2i α1i α2i 
-3.57 -1.32 1.01 -1.62 -4.58 0.30 Aggregate 
(-10.47)*** (-3.88)*** (2.98)*** (-4.75)*** (-13.44)*** (0.87) 
Notes:  
1. *, ** and *** denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
2. α1i and α2i represents mean abnormal returns for rank period and test period respectively. 
3. t-value is in parenthesis. 
 
As is expected from the construction of the winner portfolio, aggregate rank period mean 
abnormal returns (α1i) are significantly negative for loser portfolio and significantly positive for the 
winner portfolio. While the winner portfolio displays significant aggregate performance reversal during 
the test period (α2i = -1.62%), there is no significant reversal for the loser portfolio. Instead, the loser 
portfolio shows significant continuation behaviour with test period mean abnormal returns (α2i) of -
1.32%. Arbitrage portfolio (loser – winner) however, presents a reverse in performance of mean 
abnormal returns of 0.3% during the test period, which is consistent with overreaction hypothesis. The 
results however, are not significant. 
 
Table 9: Overreaction effect with adjustment to risk: Beta 
 
Loser Winner Arbitrage  Period 
βi βiD βi βiD βi βiD 
0.11 -0.04 0.15 -0.13 -0.04 0.08 Aggregate 
(0.31) (-0.13) (0.43) (-0.37) (-0.12) (0.24) 
 
Table 9 presents the time varying risk as measured by beta. The rank period beta is estimated 
by β1i, whereas the test period beta is estimated by β1i + βiD. Change in beta from rank period to test 
period is given by βiD. The findings reveal that the risk of loser portfolio is reduced during the test 
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period (βiD = -0.04) rather than increased as expected. This is contradictory to Chan (1988)’s argument 
that the risk of loser portfolio increased thus resulting the test period beta being greater than the rank 
period beta. This implies that the loser portfolio is less risky during the test period than the rank period. 
The winner portfolio is also less risky in the test period than the rank period as reported by change in 
beta from rank period to test period (βiD) of -0.13. As expected, loser portfolio is more risky in the test 
period than the winner portfolio as presented by the arbitrage portfolio’s βiD of 0.08. 
Generally, findings of the long run stock overreaction after adjustment for risk present mixed 
results of for and against the overreaction hypothesis. Given the mixed results, the risk factor cannot 
completely account for the performance of the winner, loser and arbitrage portfolios in the test periods. 
It is worth noting that the same results were also reported by earlier studies namely Gaunt (2000) and 
Lai et al (2003) for Australian stock market and Malaysian stock market respectively. Similar results 
are also documented for small and large portfolio. 
 
4.5. Stock overreaction with adjustment to seasonality effect 
Earlier studies including De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Zarowin (1990) indicate that most of 
the overreaction effect occurs in January, and this has been linked to the evidence of January effect in 
the stock returns. Therefore, this study extends the analysis by taking into account such monthly 
seasonality in the overreaction profile. Not only the January effect, but this study also investigates 
evidence of February effect in the study of stock overreaction in Bursa Malaysia. Previous study by Ho 
(1990) and Wong et al. (1990) provide evidence of February effect and Chinese New Year effect in the 
level of Malaysian stock returns. Ahmad and Hussain (2001) on the other hand, have conjectured that 
evidence of stock overreaction in Bursa Malaysia could be due to abnormal returns earned in the month 
of February, the month which the Chinese New Year frequently took place. 
The results of stock overreaction with control for seasonality effect are presented in Table 10. 
The findings suggest evidence of February effect in the monthly excess returns of Malaysian stocks. 
Arbitrage, winner and loser portfolios provide quite similar results. The slope coefficient (Ψ2) for the 
February dummy variable is positive for seven of the nine test periods; only periods 7 and 8 for both 
winner and loser generate negative coefficient and these are not significant except for period 8 for loser 
portfolio and period 7 for arbitrage portfolio. The findings imply that abnormal returns earned (if any) 
in the test period could be due to abnormal returns earned in the month of February. 
 
Table 10: Seasonality effect 
 
January February 
Winner Loser Arbitrage Winner Loser Arbitrage Test Period 
Ψ2 Ψ2 Ψ2 Ψ2 Ψ2 Ψ2 
89-90 0.80 9.08** 7.81** 1.36 2.29 1.54 
91-92 1.20 -1.08 -1.23 2.84 -1.44 -1.51 
93-94 -0.10 -9.30* -9.09 5.07*** 11.56* 4.34 
95-96 1.20 -0.45 -2.84 1.63 2.50* 0.79 
97-98 6.95 2.49 6.84 16.01** 15.02* 10.73*** 
99-00 -0045 2.82 5.61 2.44 6.11* 2.71 
01-02 -1.76 2.24 6.02 -1.71 -9.32 -8.58 
03-04 -0.02 -0.50 2.54 -1.53 -0.99 -1.38 
05-06 2.96* 3.87 1.06 1.33 0.99 0.04 
Notes: *, ** and *** denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Compare to winner portfolio, the February effect is more noticeable for the loser portfolio. The 
finding, however, is not surprising since the overreaction effect, as suggested by earlier studies tends to 
be asymmetric in nature. It is worth to note that Ahmad and Hussain (2001) have linked the evidence 
of February effect to the Chinese New Year effect. They argue that February is important because it is 
the month in which the Chinese New Year most often falls, and in Malaysia, all ethnic groups living in 
the country celebrate the Chinese New Year in a grand scale. Furthermore, many companies also pay 
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bonuses in occasion with the festival. Therefore, like in Western market where overreaction effects are 
greater in January, the Chinese New Year effect, which is proxies by the February effect, has similar 
impact in Malaysia. 
In addition to that, no evidence of the existence of January effect is observed in this study. Five 
of nine slope coefficients (Ψ2) for January dummy variable are positive for both winner and loser 
portfolios, while six out of nine for arbitrage portfolio. Of all positive slope coefficients, only one gives 
significant t-value, which are period 9 for winner (significant at 10%) and period 1 for loser and 
arbitrage portfolio (significant at 5% level). The results imply that abnormal returns earned (if any) are 
due to stock overreaction effect and not because of abnormal returns earned in the month of January. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether overreaction hypothesis could best describe the 
Bursa Malaysia over a period between January 1987 and December 2006. Results of the 2-year stock 
overreaction behaviour for the whole period from January 1987 to December 2006 are in agreement to 
those reported by Brailsford (1992), Ising et al (2006) and McInish et al (2006). This study reveals that 
loser portfolio exhibit continuation behaviour whereas winner portfolio went on to become loser in the 
test period. Findings also show that combines strategy based on overreaction hypothesis does not 
provide potential trading profit. Nevertheless, overreaction effect does provide a strategy that offer 
potential abnormal gains for winner portfolio. When the study test the 2-year stock overreaction 
behaviour based on size, both small and large firms exhibit reversal behaviour that is consistent with 
the overreaction hypothesis. Furthermore, arbitrage portfolio for both large and small firms provides 
significant positive abnormal returns that are consistent with the hypothesis even after adjustment for 
time varying risk. No evidence of January effect is reported during the period, but there is evidence of 
Chinese New Year effect existed in the data. 
The study then extends the duration of the formation period to 5 years to test for the sensitivity 
of the overreaction effect to the length of the formation period. The study finds evidence of stock 
overreaction behaviour for the 5-year formation period over a period between January 1987 and 
December 2006. Using standard methodology of De Bondt and Thaler (1985), this study find that 
Malaysian stock market overreacts prior to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The overreaction 
behaviour diminishes during the post crisis period. Although loser portfolio exhibit continuation 
behaviour and winner portfolio has outperformed the loser, the results however are not significant. 
Thus, finding after the crisis period do not significantly support overreaction hypothesis. However, 
single trading strategy that based on winner alone may produce potential abnormal profit. Generally, 
results of the study suggest the inconsistency of the stock overreaction behaviour in Bursa Malaysia. 
According to Chen and Sauer (1997), consistent overreaction behaviour is an important factor for 
overreaction hypothesis to succeed. Therefore, given the inconsistent performance of stock returns in 
Bursa Malaysia, this anomaly may not be exploitable to earn abnormal returns on a consistent basis. As 
suggested by Ariff, Shamsher and Annuar (1998), this anomaly may not be in itself a sufficient 
condition to reject the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). In light of that contention, this study 
concludes that Bursa Malaysia is consistent with the weak form of EMH. Any inefficiency that existed 
may have contributed to the efficiency of the market. On the word of Dimson and Mussavian (1998, 
page 96), “ It is important to note that EMH does not rule out small abnormal profit before fees and 
expenses ..... to make sense, the concept of market efficiency has to admit the possibility of minor 
market inefficiency” . Close to home, Annuar (2002, page 15) writes, “market efficiency and 
behavioural finance co exists just God created us and many observations in pairs. Chaotic (irrational) 
and rational behaviours co-exist in any market be it efficient, moderately efficient and inefficient”. 
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